




Taking as its starting point the commonly held claim about the obscurity of the 
concept of sovereignty, the article first identifies a fundamental paradox between the 
classical Westphalian notion of state sovereignty and human rights. In the rhetoric 
of international politics, attempts to establish the responsibility of states to respect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms within their jurisdictions are often countered 
with claims referring to the “sovereign equality” of all states and the subsequent 
principle of non-intervention. The article suggests that in a more contemporary 
understanding of sovereignty the responsibility of a state to respect human rights 
and fundamental freedoms is seen as a constituent ingredient of the state itself. The 
chapter continues to elaborate how this change has come about. The classical notion 
of sovereignty is illustrated through a reading of Bodin’s Six Books of the Common-
wealth (1576). In Bodin’s world, sovereignty is a constitutive element of the state, 
and the possibility of a multitude of sovereign entities in a global world logically 
denying the possibility of any “supra-national” normative framework is still a minor 
consideration. This possibility is only worked out with the emergence of international 
law. In both classics such as Emmerich de Vattel’s The Law of Nations (1758) and 
more contemporary treatises such as Lassa Oppenheim’s International Law (1905), 
state sovereignty has become conditional to recognition by other sovereign states 
and a subsequent membership in the “family of nations.” The conditional member-
ship in the “family of nations” involves a contradiction: a sovereign state must act 
in a “dignified” manner, it must use its sovereignty with “restraint” by respecting 
the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens, i.e., it must employ its 
sovereignty in a non-sovereign way. This restriction of sovereignty, addressed as 
“ethical sovereignty,” becomes a constitutive element in a post-Westphalian state and 
a central ingredient in the contemporary doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The 
article further criticizes the various uses (and abuses) of “ethical sovereignty” in the 
regulation of “failing” and “rogue” states and concludes by identifying its general 
political dangers. Finally, with reference to Jacques Derrida’s Rogues (2003), the 
article suggests a more radical reappraisal of the concept of sovereignty.
It is a fact that sovereignty is a term used without any well-recognised meaning except 
that of supreme authority. Under these circumstances those who do not want to interfere 
in a mere scholastic controversy must cling to the facts of life and the practical, though 
abnormal and illogical, condition of affairs.1 
—Lassa Oppenheim
But to invoke the concept of national sovereignty as in itself a decisional factor is to fall 
back on a word which has an emotive quality lacking meaningful specific content. It is 




Article 2(1) of the Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945) states among other 
things that the organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all 
its members.3 The principle is quoted often enough in the rhetoric of international 
politics,4 but its substantial content has always been controversial. Although the 
principle is built on the premise of the equality of the sovereign states that make up 
the international community, it has always been recognized that, indeed, some states 
are more equal than others. This is, of course, already apparent in the extraordinary 
powers of the permanent members of the Security Council. But in addition to this, 
there is an apparent contradiction between the notion of non-intervention implicit in 
the principle of sovereign equality and “taking effective collective measures,” that 
is, the international cooperation that Article 1(1) of the Charter calls for.5
In 1946, in order to clarify the position of the equal and sovereign partners, the 
UN General Assembly instructed the International Law Commission to prepare a 
Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States for the members of the new 
union.6 Although the Draft Declaration was never officially adopted, it did reiterate 
in a more or less unambiguous way the principles of sovereignty and non-interven-
tion as they had been formulated in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.7 At the same 
time, the rights and duties of the Draft Declaration restate the contradiction of the 
Charter. Every state was to have the right to independently exercise its legal pow-
ers (Article 1), the right to jurisdiction over things and persons within its territories 
(Article 2), the right to equality in law amongst other states (Article 5) and the right 
to self-defense (Article 12). These state rights were contrasted with a set of duties, 
the most important of which being the duty to refrain from intervening in the inter-
nal affairs of other states (Article 3) and the duty to settle disputes with other states 
through peaceful means (Article 8).
How are we to understand this contradiction?
Referring to the Charter and the Draft Declaration, Karl Loewenstein claimed that 
the mutually exclusive nature of the notions of state sovereignty and international 
co-operation that the Charter seemed to put forward was merely apparent. Loewen-
stein, writing towards the beginning of the cold war—the deepest bipolarisation of 
world power “since the antagonism of the Christian and the Moslem world”8—noted 
that the co-operation amongst states that the Charter required necessarily involved 
restrictions on state sovereignty that would formerly have been inconceivable. In 
fact, the reality of power relations between states indicated that the assumptions of 
equality and independence, both central elements of the classical notion of sover-
eignty, were mere fictions:
In reality the notion of sovereignty and its corollaries of equality and independence are 
largely semantic and escapist formulae ignoring the fact that the dynamism of inter-state 
power relations is no longer—if it ever was—controllable by the rules of international 
law. The independence and equality of states have disappeared because, in this techno-
logical age with its vastly increased density of economic inter-penetration and political 
Minkkinen	 35
interdependence, an individual state can exist in isolated sovereignty no more than an 
isolated individual can in society.9
Even if a legal definition of cooperation was not possible, Loewenstein maintained 
that the legal character of interstate activity was demonstrated in the instruments 
through which cooperation was made possible: treaties, conventions, agreements, 
and so on. Through such instruments, states define their mutual rights and duties 
in “reciprocal action patterns.” By committing themselves to certain duties, states 
exercise their sovereignty by voluntarily sacrificing their self-determination in ex-
change for benefits that are mutually agreed upon in a given treaty or agreement. 
In this sense, state sovereignty and co-operation are complimentary rather than 
antithetical.
But the practical implementations of co-operation in a bipolarized world take 
place under an ever deepening division of the world into blocs or alliances. Within 
the alliances, a fundamental inequality of individual member states, incompatible 
with the traditional notion of sovereignty, develops:
Although equality is considered the principal attribute of sovereignty, it may not exist in 
fact in international co-operation. The hegemonial structure of each power bloc does not 
easily lend itself to preserving the equality of rights and duties amongst the participat-
ing states that international law presupposes. The very existence of a hegemonial center 
within the co-operating group cannot fail to result in the diversity of rights and duties 
which the smaller and weaker partners may well consider onerous limitations of their 
self-determination, or intervention, even if voluntarily undertaken.10
Notwithstanding the practical limitations of sovereign equality that Loewenstein 
refers to, the Draft Declaration also tempered the essentially non-interventionist 
notion of the classical doctrine of sovereignty with a duty that did not pertain to the 
external relations of a state to its counterparts. This duty had more to do with the 
ways in which a state exercised its internal sovereignty vis-à-vis its own subjects:
Every State has the duty to treat all persons under its jurisdiction with respect for hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion (Article 6).11
The monitoring of how individual states fulfill their duty to respect such rights 
and freedoms would, in Loewenstein’s terms, constitute an example of international 
co-operation in humanitarian issues.12 Cooperation through reciprocal rights and 
duties would subsequently also suggest that if a state did not comply with its duty 
to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, effective countermeasures were 
both required and justified. By taking on such a duty, a state has voluntarily forfeited 
its sovereignty to such an extent that if it violated against particular obligations, an 
intervention by another party—another state or an international organization—would 
be called for.
The Draft Declaration, however, does not seem to understand the duty to respect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as a contractual obligation that follows 
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from either membership in a treaty or voluntary commitment to an agreement; 
the duty requires no ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. Indeed, Hans 
Kelsen, who was highly critical of the legal status of the draft to begin with, noted 
that the duty to respect human rights had no basis in general international law, nor 
could such a duty be legally concluded from the Charter of the United Nations.13 It 
would, then, seem that this duty follows from the mere fact that the state is what it 
is namely that it is a sovereign subject.
How can such a duty be inferred from sovereignty? Rather than sovereignty 
and state obligations being complementary as Loewenstein claims, can normative 
obligations arise from sovereignty itself?
Sovereignty and State
Answering these questions requires an overview of how the notion of state 
sovereignty has developed and mutated. Jean Bodin is usually quoted as the first 
writer to have introduced a theoretical definition of sovereignty. Bodin’s sixteenth 
century book has two explicit aims. First, it is an attempt to define the meaning of 
a “republic.” In this particular context, the “republic” is not, of course, a particular 
form of regime but rather the res publica, the polis, or the “public affairs” that belong 
to all forms of government. In short, Bodin’s book is a theory of the state.14 But 
secondly, the book also attempts to determine which particular form of government, 
i.e., monarchy, aristocracy, or the “popular state,” is the best. It is well-known and 
documented how Bodin’s point-of-departure is an apology of and for the French 
monarchy, and as such, many of its central arguments can be said to be built on 
that premise. But the preference for monarchy over other forms of state refers to 
the very idea of sovereignty:
But the principal aspect of a state, namely the right of sovereignty [le droit de souver-
aineté], can strictly speaking exist and subsist only in a monarchy, because in a state only 
one can be sovereign. If there are two or three or more, there is no sovereign because then 
no one can either give law to or receive it from his companion….15
Sovereignty, then, is always an issue of law.
Bodin begins his main argument with a rudimentary definition of the state: a state 
is the rightful (droit) government of a multitude of households and their common 
interests by a sovereign power.16 There are, accordingly, three different characteristics 
to a state. First, a government is rightful to the extent that it is ordered according to 
the laws of nature which, Bodin insists, is also the “true sign of friendship.”17 Right-
ful government must pursue the principal end of the state as true happiness, i.e., the 
sovereign good. The sovereign good and the ultimate purpose of the individual as 
well as of the state is the contemplation of things natural, human, and divine after 
basic material needs have been satisfied.18
Secondly, a family well administered is the image of the rightful order of the state. 
A family lives under the sovereign power of its head who manages the household’s 
common affairs.19 Like a state, a family as a household requires the sovereign au-
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thority of its head to unite the different members into a single entity. The sovereign 
authority of the head of the household is, of course, the patria potestas, the power of 
the Roman father over the persons of his descendants and, more generally, the rights 
and privileges that he enjoys by virtue of his paternity.20 But a household is also the 
main constituent of a state. However, a single family is not enough and, moreover, 
the numerous households that make up a state must share a “public domain”—the 
government of which they are willing to submit to a sovereign ruler.21
And finally, a state presupposes the existence of a sovereign power:
But just as a ship is but timber lacking the form of a vessel without a keel to support the 
ribs, the prow, the poop and the tiller, neither can there be a state without a sovereign 
power to unite all its several members and parts, be they households or colleges, into a 
single body … for it is not the town or the individuals who make up a city, but the union 
of a people under a sovereign authority….22
How should one characterize such sovereign power? For Bodin, it is both absolute 
and perpetual. Sovereign power cannot be founded on a commission, let alone on a 
time-limited mandate. For the essential characteristic of sovereignty is that however 
much power is delegated, the true sovereign retains his power through a curious 
logic of supplement and reserve:
the person of the sovereign is in legal terms always excepted in relation to the power 
and authority that he gives to another, and he can never give so much of it that he would 
not always retain more. He can always command or acknowledge by way of prevention, 
accord, evocation, or in any way that pleases him regarding matters that he has placed 
into the hands of the subject23
In a democracy or a popular state where the people have elected a representative 
to govern over them, the latter can be sovereign only if his power is absolute. In 
such a case, the people must necessarily have “relinquished and shed themselves 
of sovereign power.”24 But because the sovereign cannot recognize a rival authority, 
he cannot be bound by the laws that his subjects must abide by. Consequently, the 
sovereign is not bound by either his own laws or those of his predecessors.
But Bodin tempers this seemingly absolute notion of sovereignty with four excep-
tions. First, even the sovereign must comply with the laws of God and nature that all 
worldly creatures must abide by.25 Second, civil laws insofar as they are equitable 
and reasonable, are often but reflections of the principles inherent in the laws of 
nature and are, consequently, equally binding.26 Third, the sovereign is limited in 
relation to the fundamental laws that concern the constitution of the realm especially 
insofar as they are directly annexed to the existence of the Crown.27 And lastly and 
most importantly, the sovereign is bound to the covenant that he has consented to 
with his subjects. For sovereignty is only significant in relations of law:
Law and contract must not be confused: whereas law relies on the sovereign that can 
oblige all his subjects but not himself, a covenant obliges both parties reciprocally. Neither 
party may contravene with prejudice without the consent of the other. In this case, the 
Prince has nothing superior in relation to the subject.28
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In the original covenant, both parties must by necessity be recognized as equals, 
for otherwise Bodin would be compelled to define the fundamental constitution of 
the state merely as yet another act of legislation, i.e., a dictate of a sovereign will. 
In the covenant, Bodin continues, the subject is defined as citizen and the initial 
contents of the social contract are constituted:
The citizen is, then, characterised by the free subject’s [franc sujet] recognition of and 
obedience in relation to his sovereign Prince, and the Prince’s guidance, justice and 
defence in relation to the subject….29
It is, therefore, obvious that sovereign power is intimately related to law:
One can therefore see that the principal aspect of sovereign majesty and absolute power 
lies mainly in giving laws to subjects in general and without their consent.30
For Bodin, law is by definition the rightful command of the sovereign ordering 
all subjects without exception in general or in particular, save the sovereign law-
giver himself, for the sovereign must necessarily be excluded from the power and 
authority of the laws that he himself gives.31 The principal attribute of sovereignty 
is the power of legislation, the ability to give valid and effective laws, and all other 
possible attributes can be inferred from the power of legislation:
Included in the very power to give and to abolish laws are all the other rights and attributes 
of sovereignty and, in fact, strictly speaking one can say that this is the only attribute of 
sovereignty. For it includes within itself all other rights such as waging war and making 
peace, acknowledging in the last instance the judgements of all magistrates, appointing 
and dismissing the highest officials, imposing taxes and levies on the subjects, granting 
grace and exemption against the rigour of the law, increasing or decreasing the titre, 
evaluating and weighing the coinage, receiving oaths of loyalty from both subjects and 
liegemen alike regardless of who their pledge is due….32
But if sovereignty obeys a logic of supplementarity and reserve, if Bodin’s sover-
eign can, for example, delegate his legislative powers either partially or totally to 
a representative body—an Assembly of the Estates, a Parliament, etc.—but still 
remain “seized [saisis] of the power and jurisdiction” involved, what is the reserve 
that persists? Bodin gives no unambiguous answer. But if sovereignty is for the most 
part exercised in lawgiving, this reserve may well be understood as the normative 
validity of all laws. For even if the representative lawgiver may order the subject to 
act in certain ways, the subject acknowledges his general obedience in relation to 
all law only through the majesty of a sovereign power.33 
Sovereignty Externalized
For Bodin, then, the existence of a sovereign power is the essential prerequisite of 
a state. In the work of Grotius, this “internal sovereignty” is coupled with its external 
counterpart that establishes the national sovereign’s position in an ever-expanding 
mercantilist world. Defending Dutch colonial interests against declining Portuguese 
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power in the East Indies, Grotius first defines sovereignty as a form of ownership 
including both legal title and factual possession. And for this reason sovereignty 
cannot be claimed in relation to the sea:
because the sea is just as insusceptible of physical appropriation as the air, it cannot be 
attached to the possessions of any nation.34 
Later Grotius continues that sovereignty is by definition a power that is not subject 
to the control of another so that it could be annulled or abolished at will. When 
speaking of political entities, sovereign power resides in the civil state (civitas) 
understood as the perfect association of men. But by making a distinction between 
common and proper subjects, Grotius clarifies that this power can be exercised by 
one or more persons according to the laws and customs of a given nation.35
Writing some half a century later, Pufendorf, on the other hand, is much more 
straightforward in defining the state as the sovereign authority:
Authority over an equal, as such, is impossible. Therefore, when Grotius argues that the 
people, at least, are equal to the Prince because in some particular cases they may com-
pel him, he must at the same time allow that neither Prince nor people have authority or 
sovereignty over the other, which is repugnant to the nature of a civil state.36
He devotes much time and effort to contest assumptions concerning the divine origin 
of sovereignty. In addition to a title or a style that signifies the rightful employment 
of civil authority, sovereignty requires a “natural strength,” i.e., a factual ability to 
compel. Majesty is not conferred to a mundane authority by a divine entity that, 
unlike an ungoverned multitude of men, would originally be its possessor. Quite the 
contrary, sovereignty is an attribute of government, a moral quality that is produced 
when several non-sovereign attributes concur in a harmonious unity. Sovereignty, 
accordingly, resides originally in the association of men as a civil state. Pufendorf, 
however, is far too pragmatic to dwell longer on the essence of sovereignty, whether 
sovereignty is capable of transmigrating in royal metempsychosis, and so on:
to enquire after the cause of majesty or sovereignty, taken in an abstracted sense, is no 
better than impertinence in as much as it never exists except in the concrete. It is just the 
same as if I should take a particular search into the cause of human nature abstractly con-
sidered when as to the cause of men, in the concrete, I have sufficient information.37
As far as sovereignty is concerned, Pufendorf is also a strict monist. Although 
it can be approached through the different powers it entails—for Pufendorf, these 
are the power of legislation, judiciary power, the power of war and peace, and the 
power of appointing magistrates—sovereignty is first and foremost a consolidation 
of these different attributes in a single body. But once again Pufendorf’s arguments 
are rather pragmatic than theoretical:
these parts of the sovereign power are naturally so united, and, as it were, interwoven 
with one another, that should we suppose some of them to inhere in one person, some in 
others, the regular frame of the state must absolutely be destroyed.38
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Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s contributions to the sovereignty debate have less to do with 
state theory itself than with the recognition of a logical problem that arises from it: if 
the world is understood as the battlefield of a number of sovereign entities—nations, 
states, Princes, etc.—how is an orderly global existence possible without positing a 
super-sovereign power? How can equal sovereignties coexist without compromising 
their majesty? This has been one of the key issues of international law ever since it 
has been recognized as a discipline of its own.
The first consistent attempt after Pufendorf to develop the concept of sovereignty 
in relation to a world order was Emmerich de Vattel’s Le droit des gens, originally 
published in 1758. Quite unlike the pragmatic emphases of Pufendorf, Vattel finds 
his theoretical inspiration from Christian Wolff’s rationalist philosophy of natural 
law.39 For Vattel, the law of nations was a legal science [sic] that examines a supra-
positive law (droit) amongst nations or states and the corresponding obligations 
that such a law implies.40 Because nations are formed of free and autonomous men 
for whom the laws of nature apply, the law of nations must also be derived from 
natural law:
One must, then, apply to nations the rules of natural law in order to find out what their 
obligations and their rights are. Consequently the law of nations is originally merely 
natural law applied to nations.41
Following Wolff, Vattel calls this the necessary law of nations. It is necessary because 
it is not founded on the rights that nations may have in relation to one another, but 
on the obligations that they must comply with without exception. These obligations 
cannot be altered or renounced in conventions or covenants; they belong to the as-
sociations of free men as such.
A nation being a political body that follows from the necessary association 
amongst men, Vattel identifies the sovereignty within this state as the public political 
authority that is required to govern the association. A state is sovereign if it governs 
itself without outside interference.42 Sovereignty is the autonomy of the state un-
derstood as a moral person, its ability to commit itself to the duties and obligations 
that follow from natural law:
sovereignty is the public authority that commands in civil society ordering and directing 
what everyone must do in order to reach that end. This authority belonged originally and 
essentially to the very body of society to which everyone submitted himself and gave up 
the rights he had received from nature to act in all matters as he wills according to his 
own reason, and to do himself justice.43 
Sovereign and autonomous states have two primary obligations: preservation and 
perfection. First, the nation is obliged to maintain and to care for the core of the 
initial association:
In the act of association through which a multitude of men together form a state or a nation, 
each individual is committed in relation to all to procure the common good, and all are 
committed in relation to one another in facilitating for themselves the means to provide 
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for their needs, to protect them and to defend them. It is evident that such reciprocal 
commitments can only be complied with by maintaining the political association.44
But secondly, the ultimate end of the state is a civil society where the needs of indi-
vidual citizens have all been satisfied. Perfection, i.e., the fulfilled happiness of its 
individual members is, then, both the moral obligation of the state as a whole and 
the civic duty of its citizens.45 In his treatment of these two primary obligations, 
Vattel displays a certain instrumental morality. The legal or moral quality of the 
state is defined primarily by way of its obligations and duties, whereas state rights 
are secondary. Both primary obligations of the law of nations can be concluded 
from the ultimate end of human association as civil society. The nation must both 
preserve the initial constitution required in the pursuit of civil society and dedicate 
its individual activities to the “double perfection” of both itself and the state into 
civil society. On the other hand, the corresponding rights are laconically defined as 
all possible means necessary to achieve these ends.46
In relation to the external world, the duties and the rights of a representative 
sovereign are the same as those of his nation. But his authority is always limited 
by the mandate he has received, for the true sovereign is always the association of 
men as a nation and a state:
Dignity and majesty reside originally in the body of the state; the sovereign receives his 
dignity and majesty by representing the nation.47
For Vattel, the world must consequently consist of a number of equally sovereign 
state-entities represented by individual monarchs and leaders. But because there 
are no coded norms that could legitimately regulate intersovereign relations, the 
sovereignty of an individual state vis-à-vis another must necessarily be based on 
something resembling voluntary recognition. Vattel understands this recognition as 
the reciprocal respect that arises from communal membership:
Every nation, every sovereign and independent state is worthy of consideration and respect 
because it immediately appears in the great society of mankind, because it is independent 
in relation to all power on the earth, and because it is an assemblage of a large number of 
men that is undoubtedly more important than any individual. The sovereign represents 
the whole nation, in his person he unites it in all of its majesty.48
If a sovereign state is internally by nature obliged to both preserve and to perfect 
itself, externally, i.e., in relation to other sovereign states, it enjoys certain rights. It 
would seem that such rights arise from the respect due to a nation that partakes in 
the family of nations by taking its obligations seriously. With regard to their primary 
obligations of preservation and perfection, all nations and sovereign states enjoy the 
right to security, i.e., a perfect right to protect themselves with preventive, compensa-
tory, and punitive measures against anything that would endanger their commitment.49 
But even if retaliation may be justified in certain circumstances, interference in the 
internal matters of another state is otherwise forbidden. The normative power of this 
prohibition is, once again, founded on the respect that sovereignty entails:
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It is a manifest consequence of the freedom and independence of nations that they all 
have the right to govern themselves as they deem appropriate, and one nation has no 
right to interfere in the government of another. Of all the rights that belong to a nation, 
sovereignty is undoubtedly the most precious, and it should be respected by others as 
scrupulously as possible if they wish to avoid doing harm.50
When Vattel speaks of sovereignty, it would seem that he is using the term in 
two different ways. For the most part he is referring to the representative sover-
eignty of the Prince that is always conditional. Even in international relations, the 
sovereignty of the Prince is always dependent on the mandate that the nation has 
given. If abused, the mandate can be revoked, although the nation should use this 
unalienable right with reserve. But sovereignty seems to also refer to the autonomy 
and independence of one nation and state in relation to another. The sovereignty of 
nations is not regulated by written codes and rules but by the respect and dignity 
that natural law prescribes to the free associations of men, at least as far as they 
are committed to their primary obligations. True sovereignty resides in the nation 
as an association of men under natural law. More accurately, sovereignty as moral 
autonomy and political independence is a “human right” that belongs to man under 
natural law.
Man, however, does not refer here to an individual or essential being, but to the 
social being who has by necessity allied with his fellows into a political body in the 
pursuit of well-being. Sovereignty belongs to the nation or to the state only insofar 
as it is understood as a moral person that employs understanding and will and is 
thus capable of obligations and rights.
Ethical Sovereignty
If any intermediate conclusions can be drawn from these brief sketches, it would 
seem that despite its uses and abuses in the factual world of politics, the notion of 
sovereignty has developed and transmuted in a fairly consistent way. Bodin’s first 
attempts at a definition of sovereignty arose from the need to establish a secular 
foundation for state power. As it was represented in the symbolic figure of a pater 
patriae, sovereignty was the absolute power exercised in lawgiving that constituted 
the disparate populace as a unified nation. What unifies the nation is, of course, its 
unconditional submission: “what makes us one is that we all submit.” But in an ever-
expanding cosmology, this internal state logic was bound to require an expansion. 
Now subjected within the state according to a constitutional logic, the true bearer 
of sovereignty was soon to be identified as the nation, i.e., a unified association of 
free men: true sovereignty does not reside in the power that subjects into one but, 
rather, in the power of being one in subjection.
However, if we are to hold on to the central idea that sovereign nations and states 
are all equal in their naturally endowed obligations and rights, their interrelations 
present a problem that must somehow be overcome, a problem that could perhaps 
be described as the contradiction between “internal” and “external” sovereignty.51 
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Because sovereign entities cannot (logically) acknowledge anything “higher” or 
“above,” their mutual affairs would at first sight seem to take place in a lawless and 
belligerent state of nature. So in order to account for the rights that sovereign nations 
and states must inevitably enjoy, Vattel draws on the voluntary recognition of sovereign 
states as moral persons that comply with their primary, naturally endowed obligations. 
Compliance implies membership in a community, in a curious “family of nations” that 
is no longer built on the absolute power of the paterfamilias. What we have instead is 
a fragile network of unilateral acknowledgements and corresponding respect where 
sovereign power is seen as an irregular potentia rather than potestas.52
How does this development manifest itself in the contemporary world?
In his influential treatise on international law, Lassa Oppenheim identifies 
sovereign states as international persons, that is, the subjects of international law. 
In addition to the more or less material conditions of an identifiable people, a ter-
ritorial country, and a structured regime, the government of such a state must be 
sovereign:
Sovereignty is supreme authority, an authority which is independent of any other earthly 
authority. Sovereignty in the strict and narrowest sense of the term includes, therefore, 
independence all around, within and without the borders of the country.53
As a heuristic tool of analysis, Oppenheim recognizes three overlapping aspects in 
sovereignty: external independence, territorial supremacy, and personal supremacy. 
External independence refers to the ability of the state to manage its international 
affairs according to its own discretion, its ability to form treaties and alliances, and, 
in the last instance, to make war and peace. Territorial supremacy, on the other hand, 
is an allusion to the ability of the state to adopt, for example, the constitutional 
framework of its choice, to legislate as it sees fit, and to arrange its internal safety 
in the most appropriate way. Both external independence and territorial supremacy 
seem to imply the existence of a sovereign power or a government that is capable 
of materializing the potential characteristics of a state. But it is especially the third 
aspect, namely personal supremacy, that presents problems. Personal supremacy 
allegedly grants the state dominion over its subjects “according to discretion.”54 
Even if this sovereign dominion in all its three aspects is restricted and, unlike what 
many of Oppenheim’s continental counterparts claim,55 is not to be understood as a 
state’s right, the restrictions that Oppenheim identifies are formal and legal in nature: 
the sovereignty of foreign states must be respected, the obligations of international 
treaties must be complied with, and so on.
For Oppenheim, the only way to become a subject of international law or, in other 
words, an international person as a sovereign state, is through the recognition of 
other sovereign states.56 Although the recognition of a sovereign state is in general 
categorical—if a state is securely and permanently established, recognition should 
more or less automatically follow—it is also a matter of policy and can, accordingly, 
be conditional. Oppenheim does not treat the matter explicitly, but the recognition 
of sovereignty also pertains to a dignity that is expected of all sovereign states:
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A State that enters into the Family of Nations retains a natural liberty of action due to it in 
consequence of its sovereignty, but at the same time takes over the obligation to exercise 
self-restraint and to restrict its liberty of action in the interest of that of other States.57
Sovereignty can, then, be understood as a dual structure in which a supreme authority 
that is “independent of any other earthly authority” is coupled with the self-restrictive 
mentality that dignity requires. Self-restriction is not a delimitation of the self-de-
termination of individual states. When it is employed in cooperative relations with 
other sovereign states, dignified self-restriction is a manifestation of sovereignty 
itself, because only a state that acts with dignity can be recognized as sovereign. 
As supremacy over territory and subjects and concurrent self-imposed restrictions, 
sovereignty is both right and duty, the simultaneous right of unconditional supremacy 
and the obligation to use that right with restraint. A state is sovereign only if it is 
recognized as such, and it is recognized and consequently admitted into the “family 
of nations” only if it exercises its sovereignty in a non-sovereign way.58
This dignity-induced obligation of self-restriction is at the core of the new “ethical 
sovereignty”59 that is often referred to in the rhetoric of contemporary international 
politics. One starting point of the current debate can be traced to the Secretary-
General’s address to the Fifty-Fourth session of the UN General Assembly in Sep-
tember 1999 in which he contrasted the sovereignty of states with the sovereignty 
of individual human beings:
The sovereign state, in its most basic sense, is being redefined by the forces of globaliza-
tion and international cooperation. The state is now widely understood to be the servant 
of its people, and not vice versa. At the same time, individual sovereignty—and by this 
I mean the human rights and fundamental freedoms of each and every individual, as 
enshrined in our Charter—has been enhanced by a renewed consciousness of the right 
of every individual to control his or her own destiny.60
The new notion of “ethical sovereignty,” that is, a state’s sovereign power coupled 
with the rights and freedoms of the individuals that make up its subjects, is, perhaps, 
an echo of Article 6 of the Draft Declaration and constitutes a clear departure from 
the essentially non-interventionist core of classical Westphalian sovereignty. It has 
been used as a justification for intervention in at least two ways.
First, it has enabled humanitarian intervention into tragedies that have arisen from 
civil wars and conflicts as in the cases of Kosovo and Bosnia. A key responsibility of 
a state or, in other words, an element of its sovereignty is to guarantee a minimum 
acceptable level of well-being for its citizens. If this should not be possible due 
to the disintegration of the state structure because of war or conflict—the rhetoric 
speaks of “failed” and “collapsing” states—intervention is both ethically right and 
legally legitimate. “Ethical sovereignty” as the right to intervene is a restrictive 
interpretation of intervention into the internal matters of another state. The limits 
of intervention are, however, strictly humanitarian. In a well-known albeit contro-
versial ruling from 1986, the International Court of Justice stated that while a state 
may form an appraisal of how human rights are respected in another state, the use 
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of force is not the appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect. The pro-
tection of human rights is, the Court claims, a strictly humanitarian objective and 
is, therefore, incompatible with military measures.61
But, second, “ethical sovereignty” has also been interpreted in a more expansive 
way in that it not only establishes a right to intervene but also a responsibility to 
protect. While sovereignty as the right to intervene implies a restrictive logic in 
which the exceptional use of intervention must be tested against a set of estab-
lished criteria—preferably legal criteria—sovereignty as the responsibility to 
protect justifies intervention in a reverse way: there is, if not a legal, then at least 
a universal moral responsibility to monitor and to secure the fundamental needs, 
rights, and freedoms of all people. These needs, rights, and freedoms go beyond 
traditional humanitarian issues and are often collectively called “human security.” 
For example, a report by the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty claims that:
Thinking of sovereignty as responsibility, in a way that is being increasingly recognized 
in state practice, has a threefold significance. First, it implies that the state authorities are 
responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion 
of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that the national political authorities are responsible 
to the citizens internally and to the international community through the UN. And thirdly, 
it means that the agents of state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they are 
accountable for their acts of commission and omission.62
A state is accountable for protecting the human security of its subjects, and if it 
fails to do so, an outside party—another state or an international organization—is 
obliged to act. Human security is not always threatened by war or conflict, for the 
object of such an intervention is often characterized as a “rogue” state or a politi-
cally unacceptable regime.
The responsibility to protect involves two obliged parties. There is, first, the 
responsibility of the state to see to the protection of human security within its own 
jurisdiction, a responsibility establishing the accountability of sovereign states in 
relation to their own subjects. But because human security is a set of allegedly 
universal individual rights—human rights, if you will—these rights must also be 
respected and protected by the global community at large. The responsibility of the 
global community understood both as individual states and international organiza-
tions to protect human security overrides any claim to sovereignty that a state might 
make.53 In the absence of legal instruments proper that could establish global legal 
obligations,54 this responsibility can only be inferred from a recognized sovereignty 
as membership in the international community.
Sovereignty against Sovereignty
In Jean de la Fontaine’s fable, the malicious wolf that has come upon the feeble 
lamb at a spring accuses the latter of all his miseries and refuses to listen to the lamb’s 
rational counter-arguments. No, enough with explanations, the wolf proclaims:
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il faut que je me venge. 
Là-dessus, au fond des forêts 
Le Loup l’emporte, et puis le mange, 
Sans autre forme de procès.65
In Voyous, Jacques Derrida addresses the “irrational” position of the wolf and its 
philosophical implications in relation to the “rogue states” of international politics. 
It is one of the most openly political books Derrida has written, and it continues a 
line of thought that expounds on his notion of a “democracy to come.”66 According 
to Derrida, democracy understood literally as the “power of the people” suggests 
that a people, a demos, can and may decide in a sovereign way what it essentially 
is. In other words, in democracy, the people defines what it is “itself,” its “ipseity,” 
through the power to give itself its law, its force of law, its representation of itself 
and its sovereign union. The sovereign power that this democracy presupposes is, in 
a way, circular. For the decision already presupposes a demos, and yet, in democracy, 
it exercises its sovereignty by deciding what it is:
Democracy would, then, be this, namely a force (kratos), a force that is determined in 
sovereign authority ... and, consequently, the power and the ipseity of the people (demos). 
This sovereignty is a circularity or, indeed, a sphericity. Sovereignty is round, it is a 
rounded district [arrondissement].67
But in order to function, the circularity of sovereignty must also include the figure 
of a “rogue.” Without a rascal that stands for how something that is already sovereign 
is to be further democratized, the circular sovereignty of the people would enclose 
within itself and collapse. This wily exists beyond the borders of organized society in 
a domain that has traditionally been associated with freedom or, to put it in another 
way, with lawlessness. Derrida emphasizes that it is this wily figure, this “rogue” that 
makes the freedom necessary for autonomous self-determination possible to begin with. 
Before any self-determination can be exercised and the corresponding decisions made, 
one must presume a more general possibility to play with different options, a radical 
indeterminacy and indecision that belongs to the very concept of democracy.68
What is democratic about democracy is this dangerous leeway, and it also leads to 
something that Derrida calls democracy’s auto-immunity. As the experiences of the 
Algerian parliamentary elections of 1992 indicated, democracy often denies itself 
if it is threatened by some “rogue” element deemed “undemocratic.” In Algeria this 
element was the Islamic movement; in contemporary America, it would, perhaps, 
be the diverse terrorist threats that have endorsed the compromise of constitutional 
rights and freedoms through PATRIOT legislation. As democracy denies itself, a 
state of emergency deferring established rights and freedoms is set up. This auto-
immunitary suicide also reveals a paradigmatic process to the extent that, as Der-
rida rightly points out, numerous totalitarian regimes have risen to power through 
formally democratic processes. Democracy’s auto-immunity always involves its 
possible postponement (renvoi) either to another place under the pretext of protect-
ing it from its enemies or to a better time in the future.69
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So who is the undemocratic “rogue” referred to in contemporary debate? After 
a rich etymological analysis of its French equivalent voyou, Derrida concludes that 
the word is seldom used as a noun. The adjectival characterization as in “rogue 
this-or-that” is, for the most part, an attribute used in the derogatory interpretation 
of an institution, and as such it prepares its object for or justifies a sanction. If the 
attribute is understood as indifference to accepted democratic procedures and es-
tablished human rights, then, Derrida claims, the most perverse and violent of all 
“rogue states” must surely be the United States and its allies. However, the “rogue” 
abuse of power is an internal element of sovereignty. There are only “rogue states,” 
either potential or actual. The “rogue” is the state itself.70
Derrida’s “democracy to come” refers to an interminable project pursuing some-
thing that could be called the “other sovereignty,” a democratic power that can never 
complete itself. It challenges the sort of political naïveté and rhetoric that addresses 
democracy as something already established. That democracy is “to come” does 
not only refer structurally to a promise, but it also implies that democracy can never 
be present: democracy remains aporetic. It is the only constitutional system that 
facilitates, at least in principle, the right to openly question everything, including 
the very idea, concept, history and name of democracy.71
Not surprisingly, Derrida finds the traces of this “other sovereignty” in human 
rights in seemingly much a similar way as the advocates of “ethical sovereignty”:
The attempt to impose limits to the sovereignty of nation states is often done, and mostly 
in vain, by referring democratically to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One 
example among others would be the laborious creation of an International Criminal Court. 
But the Declaration of Human Rights does not constitute a principle of sovereignty that 
would limit the sovereignty of nation states understood as a principle of non-sovereignty. 
No, it is sovereignty against sovereignty. Human rights establish and presuppose man 
(equal, free, self-determined) as sovereign. The Declaration of Human Rights declares 
an other sovereignty and, consequently, reveals the auto-immunity of sovereignty in 
general.72
The difference is, however, clear. If in “ethical sovereignty” the sovereignty of the 
state is subjected to a higher ethical obligation to respect human rights and funda-
mental freedoms or, as the more current euphemism puts it, the “responsibility to 
protect human security,” Derrida’s “other sovereignty,” a “shared sovereignty,”73 
addresses the conflict as an undecidable antinomy inherent in sovereignty itself. 
Just as sovereignty as state power is always susceptible to abuse, sovereignty also 
includes within itself the democratic “rogue” that makes human rights, a particular 
domain of freedom and “lawlessness,” possible to begin with.
Understanding “ethical sovereignty” through the expansive rationale of the “re-
sponsibility to protect” lies undoubtedly behind the acceleration of crude power-
politics that we are witnessing today. On the other hand, these developments do 
not necessarily imply the demise of international law as some have seen it. For as it 
had been argued already some half a century ago, regulating inter-state power rela-
tions through concepts of international law such as sovereignty may well be more 
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or less of a “semantic and escapist” gesture. I believe that the reasons are far more 
fundamental. It is the disrepute of normative thinking as such in favor of a “realist” 
and instrumental position that appropriates the world with the boorish finesse of a 
Machiavellian Prince.
“Sans autre forme de process,” the fable’s wolf would have added.
And it is, perhaps, worth remembering that not even the most conservative strains 
of legal thinking were ever willing to go this far:
The legal unity of humankind that is only temporarily and by no means conclusively 
ordered into more or less voluntarily established states, the civitas maxima as the or-
ganisation of the world: this is the political core of the legal hypothesis on the primacy 
of international law [PM: over the sovereignty of national law] and, at the same time, the 
fundamental notion behind pacifism that, in the area of international politics, constitutes 
the opposite of imperialism.74
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